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WHEN ACTUAL INNOCENCE IS IRRELEVANT:
FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS
AFTER HERRERA v. COLLINS
Jill Hanson Reinmuth
Abstract: In Herrerav. Collins, the United States Supreme Court held that federal habeas
courts lack jurisdiction over claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
because federal habeas courts ensure only that state prisoners are not held in violation of the
United States Constitution. This Note argues that state prisoners are held in violation of the
Constitution when state procedural rules constructively bar presentations of newly discovered
evidence of innocence. This Note proposes that federal habeas courts should grant 1) an
evidentiary hearing when a petitioner makes a substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence of innocence, and 2) relief when that evidence proves that the trier of fact probably
would have had reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.

In 1982, the state of Texas sentenced Leonel Torres Herrera to death

for the murders of two law enforcement officers. Nearly ten years later,
new evidence that he was innocent of the murders was discovered. State
and federal courts subsequently rejected his repeated requests to present
that evidence, and the Supreme Court ruled that he could be executed
without a hearing to consider that evidence. In 1993, the state of Texas
executed Herrera. He went to his death declaring, "I am innocent,
innocent, innocent.... Something very wrong is taking place tonight."1
The state of Texas insists that it executed a convicted capital
murderer.2 Others say that the state of Texas murdered an innocent
man.? Most agree that Herrerav. Collinsi posed a fundamental question
about federal habeas jurisdiction. This Note addresses that question: Do
federal habeas courts have jurisdiction over claims of actual innocence
based on newly discovered evidence asserted by state prisoners who have
been sentenced to die?

1. Man in Case on CurbingNew Evidence Is Executed, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1993, at A14.
2. ProtestingInmate Executed in Texas, Wash. Post, May 13, 1993, at A4.
3. HerreraProclaims Innocence to the End Before Execution, Houston Post, May 13, 1993, at
A20; Man in Case on CurbingNew Evidence Is Executed, supranote 1.
4. 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993) (6-3 decision).
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FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS

Federal courts have jurisdiction to grant habeas relief' to federal and
state prisoners held in violation of the Constitution. Federal habeas
courts always have authority to review properly presented constitutional
claims6 and, in certain circumstances, may review questions of fact
underlying those claims. In Herrera,the Court distinguished claims of
actual innocence from claims of constitutional violations. The Court
held that federal habeas courts lack authority to review claims of actual
innocence not linked to some allegation of constitutional error in the
underlying proceedings. As a result, Herrera was executed without ever
presenting the new evidence of his innocence in state or federal court.
A.

FederalHabeasJurisdiction

Federal courts have jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to both federal
and state prisoners. The Judiciary Act of 17897 granted jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts to issue writs of habeas
corpus to federal prisoners. The Act of February 5, 1867,8 extended the
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to state
prisoners restrained in violation of federal law. The modem version of
the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides that federal courts may
issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners held "in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."9
B.

ConstitutionalClaims

State prisoners must be held in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States to obtain federal habeas relief.
Three constitutional claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the
5. Habeas corpus is a remedy for unlawful detention, especially that which results from a criminal
conviction. Habeas proceedings are not part of the original criminal trials or direct appeals. Instead,
habeas proceedings are separate civil suits that permit collateral review of the conviction. Erwin
Chemerinsky, FederalJurisdiction§ 15.1 (1989).
6. Examples of constitutional claims that are not properly presented include those that: 1) rely on
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); 2) were
not raised in the proper state appellate or collateral proceeding under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977); and 3) allege that the conviction is based on evidence obtaited in violation of the Fourth
Amendment under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
7. Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (1789).
8. Ch.28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
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Fourteenth Amendment when state rules constructively bar"0 state
prisoners from presenting newly discovered evidence of innocence in
direct or collateral proceedings. The Due Process Clause provides both
procedural and substantive protections against deprivations of life,
liberty, or property." The Due Process Clause also incorporates the
Eighth Amendment which proscribes cruel and unusual punishment. 2
Procedural due process requires that the government fairly implement
deprivations of life, liberty, or property. 3 A state procedural rule
comports with due process unless "it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."' 4 Courts consider both historic and contemporary practice
to determine whether a state rule of criminal procedure is fundamental. 5
Substantive due process prohibits government conduct which "shocks
the conscience" 6 or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."' 7 Government conduct which deprives a person of
fundamental rights must be necessary to promote a compelling
government interest. 8 Government conduct which does not restrict such
rights must bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate end of
government. 9
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause requires that punishments
comport with civilized standards.20
The Court determines these
10. The term "constructive bar" characterizes procedural rules that prohibit a petitioner from
presenting newly discovered evidence of innocence in a judicial forum at a time that is remote from
trial or sentencing, and from obtaining direct or collateral relief.
11. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,746 (1987).
12. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962); see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
14. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)). In Medina v. California, the Court adopted this framework for assessing the
validity of state rules of criminal procedure. 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (1992). The Medina Court
reasoned that state expertise in criminal procedure warranted substantial deference to legislative
judgments. Id.
15. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 864-65 (1993); see Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2577.
16. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), overruled on other groundsby Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), overruledon other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
18. 2 Ronald D. Rotunda et al., Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw: Substance and Procedure § 14.6

(1986).
19. Id.
20. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); see Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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standards based on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.""1 Both excessive and unnecessary
punishments fall outside the scope of these standards of decency.'
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause also mandates heightened
reliability in capital cases to protect adequately against the imposition of
such punishments.' The Court recognizes this requirement because the
death penalty differs from all other punishments. 4 The difference is not
one of degree, but one of kind.'
No other penalty is as final or
irremediable.26 No other penalty is as severe.' The imposition of the
death penalty marks the denial of a person's humanity.2"
C.

Findingsof Fact

Federal habeas courts may review a state court's findings of fact even
though the state court has previously ruled on the same constitutional
claim. Federal habeas courts decide whether to review a state court's
findings of fact by evaluating the adequacy of the state court hearing on
the constitutional claim. Under the standard enunciated in Townsend v.
Sain,29 federal habeas courts generally defer to a state court's findings of
fact. When the petitioner makes a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence, however, the federal habeas court will find that the
state court hearing was inadequate and will grant an evidentiary
hearing. 0
1.

HistoricPower to Review Findingsof Fact

The extension of federal habeas relief to stal:e prisoners held in
violation of the Constitution prompted a continuing debate about federal
21. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
22. Furman,408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 332-33 (Marshall, L.,
concurring).
23. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05.
24. The unique nature of the death penalty has been widely recognized. See Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181-88
(1976); id. at 231-41 (Marshall, J.,dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-91 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314-71 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
25. Furman,408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. Gardner,430 U.S. at 357.
27. Id.
28. Furman,408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. TamayoReyes, 112 S. CL 1715 (1992).
30. Id. at313.
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habeas court power to make findings of fact on constitutional claims
already litigated in state court. Critics of federal habeas relief argue that
federal courts should trust state courts to protect adequately
constitutional rights. 31 Advocates of federal habeas relief respond that
federal courts must be available to protect constitutional rights. 32 They
fear that state courts might restrict constitutional rights by failing to
make accurate findings of fact.33
Initially, federal habeas courts had no power to review state court
findings of fact on constitutional claims because these courts had no
power to grant habeas relief unless a state court lacked jurisdiction over
the original criminal proceeding.34 The Court gradually expanded the
circumstances in which a state court lacked jurisdiction. 3' Eventually,
the Court concluded that a state court lacked jurisdiction if it failed to
provide adequate corrective process to ensure that federal claims were
fully and fairly litigated.3 6 If a state court failed to provide such process,
37
federal habeas courts could reexamine the state court findings of fact.
2.

Brown v. Allen

The Court dramatically expanded the authority of federal habeas
courts to review state court findings of fact in Brown v. Allen. 38 The
Court determined that a federal court may decline to hold a hearing if a
habeas petitioner received an adequate hearing on federal claims in state
court and the findings of fact were correct. A majority agreed, however,
that a federal court must hold a new evidentiary hearing when there were
"unusual circumstances," when there was a "vital flaw" in the state factfinding proceedings, or when the state court record was incomplete or
otherwise inadequate to enable the federal court to evaluate the result
reached.39

31. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, § 15.5 n.55 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
FederalHabeas CorpusforStatePrisoners,76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 15.2.
35. Id.
36. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331-32 (1915).
History ofHabeas Corpus 254 (1980).

See William F. Duker, A Constitutional

37. Frank; 237 U.S. at 335.
38. 344 U.S. 443 (1953), overruled by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
39. Id. at 463, 503, 506.
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Townsend v. Sain

The Court clarified the power of federal habets courts to decide
questions of fact in Townsend v. Sain.4 The Court determined that a
federal court has the power to hear evidence and to find facts when a
habeas petitioner alleges facts which, if proven, constitute a deprivation
of constitutional rights, and entitle the petitioner to relief.41 The Court
also concluded that a federal court must grant this evidentiary hearing in
six circumstances.42 These circumstances superseded 43the "exceptional
circumstances" and "vital flaw" tests of Brown v. Allen.
One of the six circumstances that requires an evidentiary hearing is
when a habeas petitioner makes "a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence." 4 The Court characterized such evidence as that
which could not reasonably have been presented to the state trial court.45
The Court stressed that the newly discovered evidence must be relevant
to the constitutionality of the petitioner's detention. In dictum, the Court
suggested that newly discovered evidence relevant only to the
petitioner's guilt or innocence would not compel an evidentiary
hearing. 46 The Court implied that newly discovered evidence, relevant to
the petitioner's guilt, could not be relevant to the constitutionality of the
petitioner's detention.47 In other words, only newly discovered evidence
of constitutional error in underlying proceedings could be relevant to the
constitutionality of the petitioner's detention and would compel an
evidentiary hearing.
4.

28U.S.C.§2254(d)

Federal habeas courts presume that state court findings of fact are
correct unless a petitioner establishes that one or more of the
40. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
41. Id. at 312.
42. Id. at 313. Some scholars suggest that 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) codifies the six circumstances of
Townsend v. Sain. See, e.g., Chemerinsly, supranote 5,§ 15.5.3.
Justice White expressly rejected this assertion in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715
(1992). He distinguished Townsend from 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), cmphasizing that Townsend
describes categories of cases in which evidentiary hearings are required and section 2254(d) lists
exceptions to the normal presumption of correctness of state court findings. Id. at 1720 n.5.
43. See supra text accompanying note 39.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.

Actual Innocence After Herrera
circumstances listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) exists.4' Two of those
circumstances apply when a petitioner presents newly discovered
evidence of innocence in federal habeas proceedings. First, federal
habeas courts do not presume that state court factual findings are correct
when material facts are not adequately developed at the state
proceeding.4 9 Second, federal habeas courts do not presume that the
factual determinations are correct when the petitioner does not receive a
full, fair, and adequate hearing in the state proceeding. 0
D.

Claims ofActual Innocence

Federal habeas courts have increasingly examined the petitioner's
actual guilt or innocence, as well as the merits of the petitioner's
constitutional claim.
Initially, the Court limited federal habeas
jurisdiction by concluding that Fourth Amendment claims are unrelated
to the petitioner's actual guilt or innocence." Recently, the Court relied
on the petitioner's actual guilt or innocence to construct a gateway 2 that
permits federal habeas courts to exercise jurisdiction over otherwisebarred claims.53
1.

The IncreasingRelevance ofInnocence

Much of modem habeas jurisprudence comports with Judge Henry J.
Friendly's view of innocence.54 Friendly challenged the assumption that
habeas relief should be available for all constitutional claims." Instead,
he argued that habeas relief should be available only when the petitioner
supplements a constitutional claim with a colorable claim of innocence.5 6
Friendly believed that this rule would enable federal habeas courts to
focus on meritorious petitions, and quickly eliminate others.57

48. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(3).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6).

51. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
52. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
53. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
54. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38
U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
55. Id. at 156.
56. Id. at 142.
57. Id. at 150.
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Stone v. Powell

The Court initially stressed the importance of actual innocence in
habeas proceedings in Stone v. Powell. 8 The petitioner sought federal
habeas relief, contending that he was held in custody in violation of the
Constitution because the evidence underlying his conviction had been
discovered in an illegal search of his home. 9 The Court held that the
petitioner's constitutional claim did not state a cognizable ground for
habeas relief because the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate this claim in state court." The Court emphasized that claims of
unconstitutional searches or seizures are typically unrelated to a
petitioner's actual innocence. 1 Justice Powell reasoned that Fourth
Amendment claims deal with physical evidence that is especially reliable
proof of guilt.62 He recognized that application of the exclusionary rule
diverts the trial's focus and the participants' attention from the ultimate
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence.'
3.

Actual Innocence: A Gateway to FederalHabeasRelief

The Court recently addressed the importance of innocence in habeas
proceedings in three other contexts: procedurally defaulted claims,'
abusive writs,' and successive writs. 6 In these contexts, the Court
concluded that federal habeas courts have jurisdiction only when
constitutional violations result in the conviction of an actually innocent
person.

58. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
59. Id. at 472-73. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fourth
Amendment which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule prohibits the
admission at trial ofunconstitutionally obtained evidence. Id.at 482-83.
60. Id. at 494.
61. Id. at 489-90. Cf.Withrow v. Williams, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993) (finding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Miranda rule is not "necessarily
divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt"); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979)
(finding that claims of insufficient evidence are central to the question of guilt or innocence).
62. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
63. Id. at 489-90.
64. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
65. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
66. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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First, the Court found that federal courts have jurisdiction over
procedurally defaulted claims67 only if the petitioner shows cause and
prejudice" for failing to raise the constitutional claim in the appropriate
appellate or collateral proceeding. 9 The Court created an important
exception to the requirement of cause and prejudice, however, to permit
federal courts to correct unjust incarcerations. 7 Under this exception,
when a federal court finds no cause for a procedural default, but
concludes that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent person, the court may grant habeas
relief.7
Second, the Court decided that the same cause and prejudice standard
used to excuse procedural defaults should also govern the determination
of inexcusable neglect in the abuse of the writ context.72 Both the
doctrine of procedural default and the doctrine of abuse of the writ
focused on whether a petitioner had a legitimate excuse for failing to
raise a claim at the appropriate time.73 The Court also said that federal
habeas courts may excuse a petitioner for failing to raise the claim if that
petitioner shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result.74 The conviction of an innocent person would be a
fundamental miscarriage ofjustice.7 5
Finally, the Court concluded that the "ends ofjustice" required federal
courts to entertain a successive habeas petition76 only if a petitioner

67. Procedurally defaulted claims are those that the petitioner failed to raise in the appropriate
appellate or collateral proceeding. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81-82.
68. The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined "cause" or "prejudice." The Court has stated
that cause may be satisfied when a procedural default "is not attributable to an intentional decision
by counsel made in pursuit of [the defendant's] interests." Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). The
Court has said that the petitioner may establish "prejudice" by showing that the constitutional
violation "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
69. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982); Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.

70. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537; Murray,477 U.S. at 495-96.
71. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537; Murray,477 U.S. at 495-96.
72. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991). Under the abuse of the writ doctrine, relief
may be denied when claims are presented for the first time in a second or subsequent habeas petition.

Id. at 1457.
73. Id. at 1468.
74. Id. at 1470.
75. Id.
76. A successive habeas petition raises a constitutional claim that was considered and rejected on
the merits in a previous habeas petition. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,438,444 (1986).
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supplemented a constitutional claim with a showing of innocence. 77 The
Court's holding reflected a balancing of the petitioner's interest in
challenging the constitutionality of custody with the State's interest in the
orderly administration of the criminal justice system."8
These decisions reflect a general trend in federal habeas jurisprudence
requiring petitioners to assert colorable claims of innocence in addition
to constitutional claims to obtain federal habeas relief. The decision in
Herrerasidestepped this trend and ignored the risk that an innocent man
would be executed.
E.

Herrera v. Collins

The procedural history of Herrera spans more than a decade.79 In
1982, a Texas state court convicted Leonel Torres Herrera of the capital
murder of a local police officer and sentenced him to death. 8' He
subsequently pleaded guilty to the murder of a state public safety
officer.8" Herrera unsuccessfully appealed his conviction.82 State83 and
federal84 courts also denied his petitions for habeas relief. Herrera then
filed a second petition for state habeas relief, claiming that newly
discovered evidence proved that he was innocent. Although he
supported his claim with affidavits, the state rejected his petition.8
In 1992, Herrera filed his second petition for federal habeas relief,
claiming that he was actually innocent of the murders. Again, he

77. Id. at 454 (plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 452 (plurality opinion).
79. Protracted litigation is common in death penalty cases. The lea3t complicated case may be
presented to the Supreme Court a minimum of three times. After the state court of last resort affirms
a conviction, the defendant files the first petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Following
state postconviction proceedings, which may include a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
the defendant files the first federal habeas corpus petition in federal district courL The defendant
appeals the denial of this petition to the court of appeals, and petitions for certiorari to the Supreme
Court. Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases 43 & n.15 (1990) (containing the American Bar Association's recommendations on death
penalty habeas corpus).
80. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 857 (1993).
81. Id.
82. Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
83. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 858 (1993) (citing Ex Parte Herrera, No. 2,848-02 (Tex.
Crim. App., Aug. 2, 1985)).
84. Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990).
85. Exparte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
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supported this claim with affidavits.86 He argued that the Constitution
prohibits the execution of an actually innocent person. The district court
granted Herrera's request for a stay of execution so that he could present
his claim of actual innocence in state court.8 7 The court of appeals
vacated the stay of execution, holding that a claim of actual innocence is
not cognizable in habeas corpus under Townsend v. Sain. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari 9 and affirmed.9"
The Court determined that the intricate boundaries of federal court
jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by state prisoners barred Herrera's
claim of actual innocence. Chief Justice Rehnquist described Herrera's
argument, that the execution of an actually innocent person is
unconstitutional, as having an "elemental appeal." 91 Although the Court
determined that federal courts lack jurisdiction because claims of actual
innocence do not raise constitutional claims, 92 the Court also suggested
that a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence may make an
execution unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief.93
1.

ConstitutionalViolations andFactualErrors

Rehnquist rejected Herrera's claim that actual innocence entitled him
to relief in a federal habeas proceeding.94 He relied heavily on the
Court's dictum in Townsend v. Sain regarding newly discovered
evidence relevant to guilt.9 He distinguished claims of actual innocence
from claims of constitutional violations occurring in underlying state
criminal proceedings.9 6 Rehnquist said that claims of actual innocence

86. His affidavits included statements by: Hector Villarreal, an attorney who represented
Herrera's older brother, Raul Sr.; Franco Palacious, a former cellmate of Raul Sr.; Jose Ybarra, Jr., a
schoolmate of Raul Sr.; and Raul Herrera, Jr., Raul Sr.'s son. Villarreal, Palacious, and Ybarra
stated that Raul Sr. confessed to the murders. Raul Jr. stated that, as a nine-year-old, he had
witnessed his father shoot both law enforcement officers. Raul Sr.'s death in 1984 complicated
further investigation of these allegations. Herrera,113 S.Ct. at 858.
87. Id. (citing Herrera v. Collins, No. M-92-30 (S.D. Tex., Feb. 17, 1992)).
88. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
89. Herrera v. Collins, 112 S.Ct. 1074 (1992).
90. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993).
91. Id. at 859.
92. Id. at 869.
93. Id.

94. Id. at 857.
95. Id. at 860.
96. Id.
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present questions of factual error,97 and federal habeas courts do not
correct factual errors.98 Instead, federal habeas courts ensure that state
prisoners are not held in custody in violation of the Constitution.99 He
concluded that federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction when petitioners
assert only claims of actual innocence. 1"
Rehnquist distinguished recent habeas decisions requiring a state
prisoner to assert both a colorable claim of actual innocence and a
constitutional claim. Those decisions dealt with habeas petitions raising
procedurally defaulted, successive, or abusive constitutional claims.0 1
Habeas jurisprudence generally bars federal courts from considering such
claims unless supplemented by a claim of actual innocence. "2 A claim
of actual innocence serves as a gateway and allows a habeas court to
consider an otherwise barred constitutional claim on the merits.0 3
Rehnquist found that Herrera's claim did not serve as a gateway,
however, because Herrera did not allege an independent constitutional
violation.
2.

Truly PersuasiveDemonstrationsofActual Innocence

Although the Court rejected Herrera's petition for habeas relief, a
majority resisted foreclosing federal habeas jurisdiction over all petitions
claiming actual innocence. With the exception of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the members of the Court either assumed arguendo or
concluded that a persuasive showing of actual innocence would make an
execution unconstitutional. 1 These justices disagreed, however, on the
showing necessary to obtain federal habeas relief.
Rehnquist assumed for the sake of argument that in a capital case a
truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence would warrant federal

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
102. See supranotes 64-78 and accompanying text.
103. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 862.
104. Although both Rehnquist and White assumed for the sake of argument that a truly persuasive
demonstration of actual innocence would make an execution unconstitutional, neither provided any
reasoning for this assumption. See id. at 869; id. at 875 (White, J., concurring).
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habeas relief.'
He did not describe such a demonstration, suggesting
only that the showing would be extraordinarily high." 6
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, declared that the
execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be
unconstitutional." 7 She declined, however, to specifically resolve the
Instead, she
issue of the showing necessary for federal habeas relief.'
simply found that Herrera could not obtain such relief under any
She characterized the evidence of Herrera's guilt as
standard.
overwhelming and his newly discovered evidence as "bereft of
credibility."' 0 9
Like Rehnquist, Justice White assumed that a persuasive showing of
actual innocence would make an execution unconstitutional.' Without
explanation, he adopted the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia."'
To obtain relief under this standard, a habeas petitioner must show that
no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record
before the jury that originally convicted the petitioner. 2
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
concluded that a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence
would make an execution unconstitutional." 3 He argued that a petitioner
may obtain relief by showing probable innocence, 1 4 rather than by

105. Id. at 869.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 871.
109. Id; see id. at 871-73 (noting that, before he died, the state public safety officer identified
Herrera, and that, when arrested, Herrera possessed a letter acknowledging responsibility for the
murders).
110. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring).
111. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
112. Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring). In Jackson v. Virginia, the petitioner
sought habeas relief, claiming that the evidence in support of his conviction was insufficient for a
rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 321.
113. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Id. Blackmun required a showing of probable innocence in light of all the evidence. Id. at
883.
Blackmun disagreed with White on the proper evidentiary showing necessary to obtain habeas
relief. He distinguished Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), noting that Jackson did not claim
that he was innocent, but that the government failed to meet its constitutional burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 883. He also distinguished Sawyer v. Whitley,
112 S.Ct. 2514 (1992), which requires that a petitioner show by clear and convincing evidence that,
but for constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have found that the petitioner was death
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showing that the trier of fact probably would have bad reasonable doubt
as to guilt."' He believed that the showing for habeas relief should be
higher than the showing needed to overcome a procedural bar to federal
habeas jurisdiction. 16
Only Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, expressly disputed the
assumption that a persuasive demonstration of actu.al innocence would
warrant habeas relief. Scalia reasoned that the Constitution, historic
tradition, and contemporary practice do not support such an
assumption.117 He concluded that the petitioner had no constitutional
right to demand judicial review of newly discovered evidence of
innocence." 8
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

Neither the Court nor the dissent recognized all of the constitutional
violations alleged by the petitioner. Although the Court correctly noted
that Herrera's claim of actual innocence raised a procedural due process
question, the Court failed to address possible substantive due process and
cruel and unusual punishment issues. 9 The dissent characterized
Herrera's claim of actual innocence as raising a substantive due process
challenge and cruel and unusual punishment issues,1 20 but failed to
address the question of procedural due process violations.' 2' As this
Note explains, claims of actual innocence raise procedural due process,
substantive due process, and cruel and unusual punishment issues.

eligible. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 882 n.6. Sawyer claimed that he was rot death eligible, not that he
was innocent Id.
115. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 882. In Kuhlman v. Wilson, the Court required the petitioner to show
that the trier of fact probably would have had reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt to
overcome a procedural bar against successive writs. 477 U.S. 436,454 n.17 (1986). See McCleskey
v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991) (requiring that a constitutional violation probably caused the
conviction of an innocent person); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986) (same).
116. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 882.
117. Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 874-75. Scalia explained that he joined the entirety of the Court's opinion "because
there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming arguendo that art asserted constitutional right
exists." Id. at 875.
119. Id. at 864 n.6.
120. Id. at 876-78.
121. In fact, Herrera raised both procedural and substantive due process claims. Brief for
Petitioner at 41 n.54, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (No. 91-7328) (1993) (reminding the Court
that the petitioner asserts violations of both procedural and substantive due process).

Actual Innocence After Herrera
A.

ProceduralDue Process

The Court erroneously concluded that Texas's refusal to hear
Herrera's newly discovered evidence did not violate procedural due
process."
By defining the relief sought as a new trial, the Court
evaluated the constitutionality of the Texas rule that limited the time in
which to move for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of
innocence. The Court considered only whether this rule offended a
fundamental principle ofjustice. By reviewing historic and contemporary
time limits on new trial motions, the Court easily concluded that such
limits do not offend fundamental principles of justice.
The Court should have defined the relief sought as a hearing in which
to present newly discovered evidence of innocence. The evaluation
should have focused on the constitutionality of the combination of Texas
rules which constructively barred"z Herrera from presenting newly
discovered evidence of his innocence in a judicial forum and from
obtaining direct or collateral relief. By reviewing the historic and
contemporary availability of hearings in which to present newly
discovered evidence of innocence, the Court would have concluded that
a combination of rules which constructively bars both direct and
collateral review violates procedural due process.
Historic practice in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that
federal and state courts increasingly granted post-conviction relief on
grounds of newly discovered evidence of innocence. In the nineteenth
century, courts preferred that a convicted person present newly
discovered evidence of innocence by direct remedies such as motions for
new trials. 24 Courts rejected efforts to present such evidence in
postconviction proceedings."z In the twentieth century, however, a
growing number of federal and state courts granted collateral relief based
on newly discovered evidence of innocence. 2 6 Typically, these courts
granted either coram nobis"27 or habeas relief.

122. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 866.
123. The Texas procedural rules required Herrera to move for a new trial within thirty days of the
imposition or suspension of his sentence. Tex. R. App. P. 31(a)(1); see Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 860.
124. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., FederalandState PostconvictionRemedies and Relief§ 1-13 (1992).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Comm nobis is a procedural writ intended to correct errors of fact. Black's Law Dictionary
337 (6th ed. 1990). Federal courts have jurisdiction to grant coram nobis relief to federal, but not
state, prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
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Contemporary practice shows that a majority of states authorize either
direct or collateral remedies, or both, on grounds of newly discovered
evidence of innocence. As noted by the Herrera Court, nine states have
no time limits and six others have waivable time limits on new trial
motions based on newly discovered evidence. 28 Twenty states permit
collateral proceedings based on newly discovered evidence.'29 Twentyeight states provide direct or collateral relief, or both, on grounds of
newly discovered evidence of innocence. 30
B.

Substantive Due Process

The Court failed to recognize that Texas's refusal to hear Herrera's
newly discovered evidence significantly increased the risk that the state
would execute an actually innocent person, and viole.ted substantive due
process. Most members of the Court suggested, and O'Connor expressly
128. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853, 866 (1993); see id. at 866 n.tl (listing Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 1181(8) (West 1985) (no time limit); Colo.R. Crim. P. 33 (no time limit); Ga. Code Ann. §§
5-5-40, 5-5-41 (1982) (30 days, can be extended); Idaho Code § 19-2407 (Supp. 1992) (14 days, can
be extended); Iowa R. Crim. P. 23 (45 days, can be waived); Mass. R. Grim. P. 30 (no time limit);
N.J R. Crim. P. 3:20-2 (no time limit); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(',)(g) (McKinney 1983) (no
time limit); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(b)(6) (1988) (no time limit); Ohio P.Crim. P. 33(A)(6), (B)
(120 days, can be waived); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.535 (1991) (five days, can be waived); Pa. R. Crim.
P. 1123(d) (no time limit); S.C.R. Crim. P. 29(b) (no time limit); W. Va. I Crim. P. 33 (no time
limit)).
129. Postconviction remedies in eight states explicitly provide for relief on grounds of newly
discovered evidence of innocence. Wilkes, supra note 124, § 1-13. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e);
Ariz. t Crim. P. 32.1(e); Colo. IL Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(v); Haw. t Pen.l P. 40(a)(1)(iv); Mass. i.
Crim. P. 30(b); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(l)(e) (1992); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(l)(g)
(McKinney 1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(b)(6) (1992).
Postconviction remedies in three other states have been construed as providing for relief on
grounds of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Wilkes, supranote 124, § 1-13. See Smith v.
Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (Fla. 1990) (construing Fla. it Crim. P. 3.850); State v. Bradley, 787
P.2d 706, 708 (Kan. 1990) (construing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507 (1983)); State v. Bembenek, 409
N.W.2d 432, 433 (Wis. 1987) (construing Wis. Stat. § 974.06).
Eight states have adopted the 1966 version of the Uniform Post-Convi:tion Procedures Act which
authorizes relief on grounds of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Wilkes, supra note 124, §
9-4; 1966 Unif. Post-Conviction Proc. Act § 1(a)(4), 11 U.L.A. 485 (1974). See Alaska Crim. it
35.1(a)(4); Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(4) (1987); Ind.Post-Conviction Remedy it l(a)(4); Iowa Code
Ann. § 663A.2.4 (West 1987); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 590.01 (1988); Okla. 3tat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1080(d)
(West 1986); MtI.Gen. Laws §10-9.1-1(a)(4) (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a)(4) (Law. Co-op.
1985).
Only North Dakota has adopted the 1980 version of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
This version also permits relief on grounds of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Wilkes,
supra note 124, § 9-4; 1980 Unif. Post-Conviction Proc. Act §l(a)(5), 11 U.L.A. 267 (Supp. 1992).
See N.D. Cent. Code § 29-32.1-01(1)(e) (1991).
130. See supranotes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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stated, that executing an innocent person would be unconstitutional.'
Yet the Court distinguished the execution of an actually innocent, but
legally guilty, person from that of an actually and legally innocent
person. 32 The Court relied on this spurious distinction and concluded
that the execution of Herrera would be constitutional because he was
legally guilty of capital murder.133
Substantive due process prohibits the execution of an innocent person
because such an execution "shocks the conscience" and interferes with
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""13
When the
government imposes a punishment that is dramatically disproportionate
to the crime, the government's conduct offends society's sense of justice
and undermines society's trust in the criminal justice system. The
execution of an innocent person amounts to the most egregious brutality
possible.
Substantive due process prohibits the execution of an actually
innocent person even if that person is legally guilty. In the death penalty
context, the distinction between an actually and legally innocent person
is spurious. The execution of an actually innocent person "shocks the
conscience" and interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" even though the person is legally guilty. Such an execution
similarly offends society's sense ofjustice and undermines society's trust
in the criminal justice system.
This distinction is especially problematic when newly discovered
evidence may prove that the legally guilty person is actually innocent.
Newly discovered evidence of innocence significantly increases the
possibility that an actually innocent person will be executed and that
substantive due process rights will be violated. As Blackmnn pointed out
in his dissent in Herrera,"[t]he execution of a person who
can show that
35
he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder."'

131. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869; id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 875 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 876 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 860.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
135. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 884 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Court also failed to recognize that Texas's refusal to hear
Herrera's newly discovered evidence violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause for two reasons. First, the combination of rules
created the possibility that Texas would execute an actually innocent
person. Second, these rules undermined the reliability of Herrera's
capital murder conviction.
The most basic constitutional limits on punishments must prohibit the
execution of an innocent person. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
36
Clause prohibits the infliction of excessive or unnecessary punishment.
The execution of an innocent person constitutes a wholly unnecessary
punishment.1 37
Such an execution serves no legitimate penal,
rehabilitative, or retributive purpose. An innocent person need not be
punished or reformed, and society needs no retribution. As Blackmun
recognized in his dissent in Herrera,"the legitimacy of punishment is
inextricably intertwined with guilt."' 38
The Court has traditionally sought to prevent the conviction and
execution of an innocent person.139 To prevent such convictions, the
Court has held that the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment mandates heightened reliability in guilt and sentencing
determinations in capital cases. 4
Rules tending to undermine the
reliability of either determination violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. The Texas rules that constructively barred Herrera
from presenting newly discovered evidence of his innocence undermined
the reliability of his conviction and sentencing, and violated his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF FOR CLAIMS
OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE
Federal habeas relief should be available to a petitioner who raises
claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence to
136. See supranotes 20-28 and accompanying text.
137. Rehnquist would argue that the execution of an actually innocent, but legally guilty, person
may be necessary to avoid "the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence
would have on the need for finality in capital cases." Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 869.
138. Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 859.
140. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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protect that petitioner's constitutional rights. When such evidence is
material to the petitioner's actual innocence, federal habeas courts should
grant an evidentiary hearing. When such evidence proves that the trier of
fact probably would have had reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's
guilt, federal habeas courts should grant relief.
4.

Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner must exhaust available state judicial remedies before
seeking federal habeas relief.'4 ' Exhaustion of state judicial remedies is
required as a matter of comity to give state courts the opportunity to
initially entertain all federal and state claims. Only when a petitioner has
exhausted all available state judicial remedies which would permit the
petitioner to present newly discovered evidence of innocence should that
petitioner be permitted to seek federal habeas relief.
B.

InadequateState Remedies

Federal courts must exercise habeas jurisdiction when state remedies
are constitutionally inadequate.
Federal habeas proceedings are
appropriate when state rules of criminal procedure prevent a petitioner
from presenting claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence.
Such proceedings are also appropriate when a state
constructively bars a petitioner from presenting newly discovered
evidence of innocence and, instead, relies on executive clemency"' to
prevent the execution of an actually innocent person.
State rules of criminal procedure that constructively bar a state
prisoner from presenting a claim of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence are constitutionally inadequate. Such rules violate
procedural 43 and substantive'" 1due
process guarantees, and the Cruel
45
and Unusual Punishment Clause.
State executive clemency proceedings that provide the only
opportunity to present claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence are also constitutionally inadequate.
Such

141. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
142. Executive clemency refers to the power of the President or a governor to pardon a crime or to
commute a criminal sentence. Black'sLaw Dictionary569 (6th ed. 1990).
143. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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proceedings are subject to human error, political mood swings, and
careless review. As a result, executive clemency is a more theoretical
than real means of preventing a miscarriage ofjustice46
First, human error makes executive clemency an unreliable means of
protecting constitutional rights. The HerreraCourt explicitly recognized
that executive clemency is fallible. 147 Recent studies showing that
clemency has not always been granted to persons believed to be innocent
support this conclusion. 4 1 Second, political mood swings may unduly
influence clemency decisions. Governors may decline to exercise
clemency powers to avoid losing bids for reelection.' 49 Governors have
also declined to exercise clemency powers to sway legislative decisionmaking5 0 and even to fulfill campaign promises."' Finally, officials
frequently forgo careful examinations of clemency petitions and simply
presume the accuracy of the judicial proceedings.'
In the absence of
extraordinary defects in the underlying criminal proceedings or egregious
violations of constitutional rights, these officials will reject requests for
executive clemency.
C.

EvidentiaryHearingsfor SubstantialAllegations of Newly
DiscoveredEvidence ofInnocence

Federal courts should reject the dictum, but follow the holding, of
Townsend v. Sain. Federal courts should recognize that factual errors
leading to the conviction or execution of an actually innocent person
result in unconstitutional detention. To protect the petitioner's
constitutional rights, federal courts should grant an evidentiary hearing
on claims of actual innocence only when the petitioner makes a
146. Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and CapriciousImposition of the
Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 844 (1986).
147. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 n.15 (1993).
148. Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof.Fustice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21 (1987). Contra Stephen J. Markman and Paul G. Cassell, Protectingthe
Innocent:A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 121 (1988).
149. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the PardoningPower from the
King, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 569, 607-08 (1991).
150. Id. at 608 (describing former California Governor Edmunc. Brown's decision denying
clemency for Richard Lindsey after learning that a legislator who favored Lindsey's execution would
withhold support from an important farm labor bill if Brown granted clemency).
151. Id. at 609 (describing former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards's refusal to commute
Wilber Rideau's sentence to fulfill a campaign promise to one of Rideau's victims).
152. See id. at 607-10; Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital
Punishment,99 Yale L. J. 389, 394,403 (1989).
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substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence of innocence.
Although a state court has already convicted that petitioner, the federal
court should not presume that the state court findings of guilt are correct
when claims of actual innocence are supported by newly discovered
evidence.
In Townsend v. Sain, the Court erroneously implied that newly
discovered evidence relevant to the petitioner's guilt cannot be relevant
to the constitutionality of the petitioner's detention."5 3 The Court
inadequately explored the relationship between factual error and
The Court failed to recognize that
unconstitutional detention.
convictions and sentences resulting from factual errors are
constitutionally indistinguishable from those resulting from procedural
errors in the underlying criminal trial.
The Court appropriately held, however, that an evidentiary hearing
should be granted when a petitioner makes a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence. 54 The standard of newly discovered
evidence for granting a new trial should be used to define the standard
for granting an evidentiary hearing. To be substantial, the evidence must
be material to the issue of the petitioner's innocence or guilt, and not
merely cumulative or impeaching. To be newly discovered, the evidence
must be that which could not have been presented at trial. The evidence
must be discovered after trial, and the failure to learn of such evidence at
the time of trial must not be due to the petitioner's lack of diligence. 55
This standard reflects modem practice in a majority of states, 156 and
represents a pragmatic approach to the problem of newly discovered
evidence. States that permit a defendant to move for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence at any time or within a waivable time limit
generally apply this standard.5 7 States that allow post-conviction relief
based on newly discovered evidence also apply this standard.'

153, See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
154, See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
155, Elizabeth A. O'Brien, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Courtand Courts ofAppeals 1988-89, New Trial, 78 Geo. L.J. 1347, 1349 (1990).
The standard differs only in that the petitioner need not show, as is required of a defendant moving
for a new trial, that the evidence would probably result in a different outcome. This difference is
appropriate because an evidentiary hearing places a much lighter burden on the state and the federal
courts than a new trial.
156, See supranotes 128-29 and accompanying text.
157. Wayne IL LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, CriminalProcedure§ 23.7(i) (1985).
158, See, e.g., State v. Schlickenmayer, 364 N.W.2d 108, Ill (N.D. 1985); State v. Sims, 239
N.W.2d 550,554-55 (Iowa 1976).
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This standard also guards against frivolous habeas petitions alleging
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. In practice, this
standard frequently bars further proceedings based on newly discovered
evidence. State courts frequently deny motions for new trials because
the "so-called" newly discovered evidence was in fact available to the
defendant at the time of trial. 59 Likewise, federal habeas courts will
deny requests for evidentiary hearings when claims of actual innocence
are not based on newly discovered evidence.
Furthermore, this standard appropriately balances the habeas
petitioner's and the state's interests. The habeas petiioner who faces the
death penalty has an especially compelling interest in saving his own
life. 60 The state has a strong interest in finality,16 ' ut also in ensuring
that only those persons who are guilty of the most serious crimes are
executed. By granting an evidentiary hearing when -:he petitioner makes
a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence of innocence,
federal habeas courts respond appropriately to both the petitioner's and
state's interests. The evidentiary hearing is the least intrusive, but
constitutionally adequate, proceeding in which the p .titioner can present
and the state can rebut the newly discovered evidence.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts should not presume that state
court findings of guilt are correct when claims of actual innocence are
supported by newly discovered evidence. Newly discovered evidence
tending to establish a petitioner's innocence strongly suggests that
62
material facts have not been fully developed at the state proceeding.
Such evidence also suggests that the petitioner may not have received an
adequate hearing in the underlying state criminal trial. 6 3 As a result,
federal courts should grant a hearing to determine whether the newly
discovered evidence persuasively demonstrates the petitioner's
innocence.

159. See, e.g., State v. Flemming, 855 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Mo. Ct. Anp. 1993); State v. Wiggins,
431 S.E.2d 755, 767 (N.C. App. 1993).
160. Similarly, a petitioner who is innocent has a "powerful and :egitimate interest" in being
released from custody. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,452 (1986).
161. Id.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(3).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6).
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D.

FederalHabeasRelief When the Trier ofFactProbably Would
Have Had Reasonable Doubt as to Guilt

Federal courts should grant habeas relief when the petitioner proves
that the trier of fact probably would have had reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt. This standard adequately protects both the petitioner's
constitutional rights and the state's interests.
Higher. standards
perpetuate a constitutionally intolerable risk-the risk of executing an
actually innocent person.
1.

Against a HigherStandard

Federal courts should reject a higher standard for determining a
petitioner's right to habeas relief to reduce the risk of executing an
actually innocent person. For example, the probable innocence standard
advocated by Justice Blackmun1 should be rejected because it imposes
an unreasonable burden on a habeas petitioner. Under this standard, a
petitioner must show probable innocence to obtain habeas relief on a
claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. In other
words, when newly discovered evidence of innocence is presented in a
habeas proceeding, the court must find that the trier of fact could not
have found that the petitioner was guilty by even a preponderance of the
evidence. If this newly discovered evidence had been presented at trial,
however, the trier of fact may have concluded that the petitioner was
guilty by a preponderance of the evidence, but not beyond a reasonable
doubt. Increasing the burden from negating proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial to establishing proof of probable innocence in a habeas
proceeding unacceptably increases the risk of executing an actually
innocent person and violating that person's constitutional rights.
2.

For the ReasonableDoubt Standard

Instead, federal courts should grant habeas relief if a petitioner shows
that the trier of fact probably would have had reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt. This standard ensures that only those persons who are
guilty of capital crimes beyond a reasonable doubt are executed.
Typically, federal habeas courts use this standard to determine whether a
petitioner raises a colorable claim of innocence sufficient to overcome a
procedural bar and to present a claim of constitutional error in the

164. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 882 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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underlying proceeding. This standard is equally alppropriate, however,
when newly discovered evidence undermines the petitioner's conviction
or death sentence.
This standard will, no doubt, alarm prosecutors and attorneys general.
They will argue that this standard will unreasonably prejudice the state's
ability to retry the petitioner. They will point out that by the time a
petitioner initiates a habeas proceeding, key witnesses may be
unavailable, critical evidence may be stale, and prosecutors and attorneys
general may be forced to rely on written transcripts of the original trial.
As a result, they will contend that the state faces a nearly impossible task
in retrying a successful habeas petitioner. Modem technology, however,
can alleviate these problems. For example, videotaping capital murder
trials allows both the prosecution and the defense to preserve the
testimony of key witnesses and the presentation of critical evidence.
E.

Conditionalor Absolute Discharge

Federal courts should grant habeas relief in the form of conditional 65
or absolute166 discharge depending on the strength of the petitioner's
proof of innocence. For example, if newly discovered evidence of
innocence proves that the trier of fact probably would have had
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt, federal courts should grant
relief in the form of a conditional discharge. if newly discovered
evidence proves that a petitioner is at least probably innocent, and
perhaps even innocent beyond a reasonable doubt, federal courts should
grant relief in the form of an absolute discharge. In such cases, absolute
relief is appropriate because the state should have ro interest in retrying
the petitioner.
IV.

ACTUAL INNOCENCE AFTER HERRERA

Until Congress authorizes federal habeas courts to exercise
jurisdiction over claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence167 . or the Court revisits Herrera and recognizes that

165. Conditional discharge means that the petitioner is discharged at the end of a fixed time
period unless the state elects to retry the petitioner. Wilkes, supranote 124, § 8-34.
166. Absolute discharge means the petitioner is unconditionally discharged and is immune from
further proceedings for the original offense of conviction. Id. § 8-33.
167. Members of the 103rd Congress introduced three bills authorizing federal habeas courts to
exercise jurisdiction over claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See H.R.
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constitutional claims are intertwined with claims of actual innocence
based on newly discovered evidence, federal habeas courts will not
exercise jurisdiction over most claims of actual innocence asserted by
state prisoners. The two exceptions to Herrera's broad rejection of
claims of actual innocence are: 1) claims of actual innocence
accompanied by claims of independent constitutional violations
occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding; and 2) claims
accompanied by "truly persuasive demonstrations of 'actual
innocence."" 68
Federal habeas courts will strictly require state prisoners to assert
claims of independent constitutional violations in the underlying state
criminal proceeding. Petitions based only on claims of actual innocence
will be rejected. The courts will emphasize that such claims allege
factual error rather than constitutional error, and are not grounds for
habeas relief.
Federal habeas courts will struggle to apply the "truly persuasive
demonstrations of actual innocence" standard. This undefined exception
purports to establish an exceptionally high threshold which federal
habeas courts will be reluctant to refine. Instead, courts will simply
conclude that the petitioner's evidence falls short of such a
demonstration.169 As a result, this exception for truly persuasive
demonstrations of actual innocence may prove meaningless in practice.

3131, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1993); H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 809 (1993); S. 1488,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306 (1993).
168. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
169. See, e.g., Von Staich v. Borg, 988 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1993) (text in Westlaw) (concluding
that the petitioner's evidence falls far short of a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence).

